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ABSTRACT
We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials.  Quality has (at least) two dimensions:
competence and honesty.  Voters prefer competent and honest policymakers, so high-quality citizens have
a greater chance of being elected to office.  But low-quality citizens have a “comparative advantage” in
pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than the market wages of high-quality citi-
zens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty).  In the political
equilibrium, the average quality of the elected body depends on the structure of rewards from holding
public office.  Under the assumption that the rewards from office are increasing in the average quality of
office holders there can be multiple equilibria in quality.  Under the assumption that incumbent policy-
makers set the rewards for future policymakers there can be path dependence in quality.
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Plato.
1 Introduction
In democratic countries crucial economic-policy decisions are taken by elected oﬃcials, either
directly, or indirectly through the appointment of top civil servants. The quality of the
political elite can therefore have important repercussions on a country￿s welfare. This paper
presents a simple theory of the quality of elected oﬃce holders.
There are at least two distinct ￿ and possibly uncorrelated ￿ dimensions to politicians￿
quality: competence and honesty. By competence we mean skilfulness at identifying the ap-
propriate economic-policy objectives and achieving them at minimum costs for taxpayers. To
make this notion concrete we will model competence as the ability to provide an indispens-
able public good with minimum tax revenues. We think competence in this sense is clearly
desirable, and in our model voters prefer competent over incompetent oﬃce holders.1 The
lack of honesty manifests itself in the harassment of private citizens, who are forced to pay
bribes or other kickbacks to oﬃce holders. A growing body of empirical work has shown
that these forms of corruption negatively aﬀect measures of economic performance, so in our
model voters prefer honest over corrupt oﬃce holders.2
We take it as self-evident that both dimensions of quality vary enormously across coun-
tries. For honesty, this assertion is easily backed by a variety of data sources. For example,
the International Country Risk Guide publishes a government corruption index for a sample
1Some readers familiar with Becker and Mulligan (1998) may see a potentially perverse indirect eﬀect from
politicians￿ competence, namely an incentive to expand the size of government. We assume the direct eﬀect
dominates from welfare￿s standpoint.
2See, among others, Mauro (1995), Hines (1995), Kaufman (1997), Tanzi (1997) and Wei (1997). Of course
there is a tradition in economics arguing that in some circumstances corruption might allow attainment of a
second-best outcome when the ￿rst-best is precluded by institutional constraints, but Myrdal (1968), Bardhan
(1997), and Kaufman and Wei (1999) observe that the institutional constraints are themselves designed to
suit the interests of a corrupt political elite. Kaufman and Wei (1999) also present empirical evidence against
what they call the ￿eﬃcient grease￿ hypothesis.
1of 126 countries. The index takes values between 0 (highest corruption) and 10 (lowest),
has a minimum of 0.18 and a maximum of 10, and a standard deviation of 2.3 (the mean
is 5.7). For competence it is diﬃcult to point to direct measures. Nevertheless, the recent
empirical growth literature has uncovered and emphasized wide disparities in the quality of
economic policy across countries. We think it is reasonable to suppose that these diﬀerences
in the quality of policies re￿e c ta tl e a s ti np a r td i ﬀerences in the competence of the political
leadership. A theory of the quality of politicians must therefore accommodate cross-country
diﬀerences in outcomes.
We develop a simple but general setup for the study of democratic political representation,
and apply this setup in turn to three models of politicians￿ quality. In the ￿rst model quality
is identi￿ed with competence. In the second model quality is honesty. And in the third model
we study the two-dimensional problem involving both competence and honesty, as possibly
uncorrelated characters of citizens.
The basic mechanism at work in all three models is as follows. Voters prefer more over less
competence, and more over less honesty. In other words, voters prefer quality. Candidates of
higher quality have therefore higher chances of election than candidates of lower quality. On
the other hand, low-quality citizens have a private comparative advantage in seeking oﬃce,
as candidates of higher quality are the ones who have more to lose from giving up private
life and/or less to gain from holding oﬃce. Competent citizens have more to lose because
their private productivity is positively correlated with their competence in oﬃce, and honest
citizens have less to gain because they will steal less if holding oﬃce. Hence, when the returns
from holding oﬃce are suﬃciently large, high-quality citizens run for and tend to win oﬃce.
However, when these returns are low, high-quality citizens choose to lead private lives, and
voters are forced to make do with low-quality candidates.
We ￿nd that the model can generate both multiple equilibria and path dependence in the
average quality of the elected body. Multiple equilibria emerge when the payoﬀs from holding
oﬃce are increasing in the average quality of oﬃce holders, for example because the social
status enjoyed by politicians is in￿uenced by the perceived quality of the political class. Thus,
there are ￿good￿ equilibria in which ￿ many oﬃce holders being of high quality ￿ it pays for
high-quality citizens to stand for election; and ￿bad￿ equilibria in which ￿ many oﬃce holders
2being of low-quality ￿ high-quality citizens are discouraged from running for oﬃce. ￿Interior￿
equilibria with various combinations of high- and low- quality citizens holding oﬃce are also
possible. Diﬀerences across countries in the quality of elected oﬃcials could therefore be
interpreted in terms of diﬀerent countries being at diﬀerent equilibria.
Path dependence emerges when we let the sitting elective body vote on a reward structure
for elected oﬃce holders. High-quality oﬃce holders will generally vote for generous oﬃce-
holder salaries, both to secure high-quality policymaking in the future (when they potentially
return to the private sector), and to enjoy the higher rewards in case they are elected again.
These incentives are shared by low-quality oﬃce holders, but in their case an additional
concern is to aﬀect their future chances of re-election. A relatively low oﬃce-holder salary
will discourage high-quality citizens from seeking oﬃce, thereby making it easier for low-
quality ones to win oﬃce. If this incentive is suﬃciently strong, low-quality oﬃce-holders
will vote for a relatively low salary. Hence path dependence: if historical accident delivers an
initial high-quality majority, the high-quality will tend to persist. But if initially low-quality
citizens are in a majority in the elective body, this low-quality will also tend to persist.
Cross-country diﬀerences in quality could therefore stem from diﬀerences in initial luck.
There is extremely little previous work that applies formal economic methods to investi-
gate the determinants of the quality of the political elite. Exceptions are represented by My-
erson (1993), for corruption, and Besley and Coate (1997, 1998), for competence.3 In these
contributions low-quality candidates can be elected if voters who share their preferences
cannot concentrate their votes on a higher-quality candidate, either because of coordina-
tion failures (band-wagon eﬀect), or because preferences and ability are perfectly correlated.
These arguments, therefore, focus on voting behavior. In our model, instead, no coordination
failures or heterogeneity of preferences among voters need to be invoked: all voters prefer
high-quality candidates, and yet low-quality candidates can be elected, simply because high-
quality citizens have better things to do. The diﬀerence stems from the fact that, instead
of voting behavior, our focus is on the self-selection of individuals of diﬀerent quality into
3O u rn o t i o no fa ne l e c t e do ﬃcials￿ competence is reminiscent of the one used in opportunistic models of the
political cycle, such as Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988), Rogoﬀ (1990), and Persson
and Tabellini (1990) (surveyed in Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997). However, these studies focus on a very
diﬀerent set of questions.
3the pool of candidates.4 For the same reason low-quality equilibria may exist even if voters
have perfect information on the candidates￿ types ￿ though our results are robust to the
introduction of asymmetric information. Voters have no illusions as to the intrinsic qualities
of the candidates, but may elect bad candidates because they are ￿rationed￿ in high-quality
candidates.
Readers skeptical of multiple equilibria or path dependence might focus on diﬀerences
in institutions. There are two possible versions of this argument. One is that the intrinsic
quality of oﬃce holders is the same across countries, but diﬀerent institutions lead to dif-
ferent structures of constraints and incentives in the policymaking process, and this in turn
generates diﬀerent outcomes. The other is that the quality of oﬃce holders itself varies be-
cause institutions, such as the electoral system, vary. We prefer our institution-free approach
b e c a u s ew eb e l i e v et h a tt h er u l e so ft h eg a m ea r et h e m s e l v e se n d o g e n o u sa n dt h ep o l i t i c a l
elite has the power to set or modify them. We think that bad rules are as likely to be the con-
sequence, as the cause, of bad politicians. In a country in which a majority of oﬃce holders
is high-quality we would expect institutions leading to bad policies, or to bad future quality,
to be removed. As we show here, however, low-quality majorities might have incentives to
keep ￿bad institutions￿ in place. We think these arguments apply to both competence and
honesty.
A related point concerns our choice of modelling corruptibility as an intrinsic character-
istic. It is common to assume that individuals are homogeneous in their propensity to act
illegally, and that the extent of corruption depends on the institutional structure. But since
institutions are designed by politicians, if politicians were homogeneous so would be institu-
tions, and outcomes (at least in the long run) would be the same across countries. Perhaps
more importantly, the homogeneity assumption is patently incorrect. The popular saying
that ￿everyone has a price￿ over which he will accept or solicit a kickback implicitly acknowl-
edges the fact that this price is generally diﬀerent from individual to individual. We model
this heterogeneity especially starkly, by making this price in￿nity for the ￿honest￿ citizens
4Dal B· oa n dD iT e l l a( 1999) go to the opposite extreme and ask under what conditions a honest policymaker
will pursue a corrupt policy. The answer is that he might be threathened with various forms of harassment
by pressure groups. Another paper that is somewhat related is by La Porta et al. (1998), but it focuses on
the quality of institutions rather than on the intrinsic quality of the members of the political leadership.
4(those who will never take a bribe) and 0 for the ￿dishonest￿ ones, but it should be clear
that all our qualitative results would go through if we had a smoother form of heterogeneity
in the propensity to take illegal payments.5
Section 2 presents the general setup of the electoral game. Section 3 develops a model of
oﬃce holders￿ competence. Section 4 focuses on oﬃce holders￿ honesty. Section 5 solves the
two-dimensional model in which citizens diﬀer both in competence and honesty. Section 6
concludes.
2G e n e r a l S e t u p
The population is constituted by a continuum of individuals of measure 1 + p. A measure
p of the population holds public oﬃce, while the rest (of measure 1) are private citizens.
Citizens in this economy play a citizen-candidate game, which is similar to the one proposed
by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). The game has three stages. In
the ￿rst stage, each citizen decides whether or not to run for public oﬃce. If yes, she makes
her candidacy publicly known. Running for oﬃce requires the expenditure of a utility cost, φ.
For most people φ is a ￿nite constant. However, for technical reasons to be discussed below,
there is a measure v (v ∈ [p,1]) of citizens who have an in￿nite cost of running for oﬃce.6
The campaigning cost φ is paid by a candidate only if a measure greater than p of citizens
5There is of course a literature on corruption, but this focuses mostly on corruption in the state bureau-
cracy. Instead, we study corruption of elected oﬃcials (￿grand corruption￿). In the literature on bureaucratic
corruption higher salaries have generally an eﬃciency-wage interpretation: they discourage bribe taking by
making it more costly to lose a public-sector job. In our framework, higher rewards from oﬃce are a way to
induce the most honest citizens to run for oﬃce. An important contribution by Besley and McLaren (1993)
analyzes both the eﬃciency-wage and the quality-selection eﬀect of wages in the context of bureaucratic cor-
ruption. See Ades and Di Tella (1997) and Bardhan (1997) for surveys of the corruption literature. We think
that corruption of elected oﬃcials is at least as important as corruption of civil servants. Elected oﬃcials are
the ultimate depositary of power and ￿ if honest ￿ they can decide to minimize corruption in the civil service.
We ￿nd it diﬃcult to imagine a country in which elected oﬃcials are consistently of high quality and the civil
servants are consistently of low quality. Indeed, other authors have argued that corruption of the bureaucracy
is simply the system through which the kleptocratic political leader extracts his rents from the private sector
(e.g. Charam and Harm, 1999).
6We discuss later the (straightforward) extension in which φ has a continuous distribution.
5have made their candidacy publicly known (otherwise there is no point in campaigning).7
In the second stage all citizens vote for one of the candidates who campaigned, if any.
Each citizen can vote for at most one candidate, and votes to non-candidates are void. The
measure p of candidates receiving the most votes are elected to oﬃce. When necessary, ties
a r eb r o k e nw i t har a n d o md r a w .I nt h et h i r ds t a g ee l e c t e do ﬃce holders and private citizens
(i.e., the non-candidates as well as the candidates who fail to win the election) collect payoﬀs,
to be speci￿ed below. In some instances the payoﬀs depend on some further action to be
taken after the election.
Citizens possess rational expectations at all times. Both the candidacy decision and the
voting decision are taken so as to maximize expected payoﬀs. Strictly speaking, because there
is a continuum of voters, each citizen has no chance of individually aﬀecting the electoral
outcome, and should therefore be indiﬀerent as to whether and for which type she votes.
This would obviously lead to a high degree of indeterminacy in the equilibrium analysis, but
indeterminacy of this kind is hardly interesting. We assume, therefore, that voters behave
as if they were pivotal. Namely, in an equilibrium no voter must have a deviation from his
voting strategy that would lead her to receive a higher payoﬀ were this deviation to have a
decisive eﬀect on the electoral outcome. If a voter is indiﬀerent among candidates in this ￿as
if pivotal￿ sense, we assume that she randomizes among them. The equilibrium is computed
by backward induction, so that it is subgame perfect.8
7We think of p as the measure of all elective oﬃces in the polity, including all levels (local, state, and
national) and functions (judiciary, executive, and legislative) of government. Of course, there is a tremendous
amount of simpli￿cation as we assume that all these oﬃces confer the same rewards and are assigned in a
unique electoral college.
8The formal de￿nition of a political equilibrium is as follows. Denote by di (equal to r (run) or n (don￿t
run)) the decision of citizen i at the candidacy stage and denote by d the pro￿le of candidacy decisions. Let
C(d) be the set of candidates given the candidacy pro￿le d.L e t Ωi(d) ⊆ C(d) denote the subset of the
candidates￿ population within which player i picks the candidate she will vote for (with a uniform draw). A









∗ is Nash given Ω
∗(•);
3. weakly dominated strategies are eliminated.
Av o t i n gp r o ￿le satis￿es conditional sincerity if and only if no voter would prefer a decrease in the measure
63 Competence
In this and in the next section we assume that the population is heterogeneous in one (and
only one) dimension, and in this section this dimension is ability (i.e., for now we abstract from
corruption). A measure s(1+p) of the population is of type s, or high ability, while a measure
(1−s)(1+p)i so ft y p es, or low ability. Hence, s is the fraction of the population of type s.W e
denote by ps t h ef r a c t i o no fo ﬃce holders who has high ability (so the measure of high-ability
oﬃce holders is psp). The measure v of citizens who never run for oﬃce is representative of
the population, so sv of them are of type s. We assume 1−v>s (1+p−v) >p so that ps =1
and ps = 0 are both feasible. For now we assume that there is perfect information: everyone
knows everyone else￿s type. We show later that the results are robust to any reasonable
introduction of asymmetric information. Our goal is a theory of the determination of ps.
A private citizen￿s utility is linear in consumption. Consumption is market income less
taxes. Market income depends on the citizen￿s type and on the provision of a public good.
Speci￿cally, if the public good is provided in the indispensable amount g∗, a private citizen of
type i receives market income λi. In other words market income depends on ability and we
accordingly assume that λs = λ > 1=λs. To simplify matters we also assume that taxes t are
lump-sum, and identical for everyone. If the public good is not provided in the indispensable
amount g∗ no economic activity can take place, so all citizens￿ market income is 0 (think of g∗
as contract enforcement). With no tax base there can be no taxes, and all citizens￿ utility is
0. These assumptions make sure that high-ability citizens have greater private returns than
low-ability ones, and that all voters prefer any government to no government, even if the only
feasible government is of very low quality.
A citizen who holds public oﬃce enjoys utility π + w.W i t h w we denote the oﬃcial
salary (including pension) of an elected oﬃcial. Since we know of no country in which
prospective oﬃce holders face oﬃcial wage schedules that are contingent on their market
of votes obtained by the candidate he has voted for in an electoral contest (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996). It is
clear that this captures the informal ￿as if pivotal￿ criterion stated in the text. Alesina and Rosenthal (1996)
show that when a voting equilibrium is conditionally sincere no coalition of voters can deviate and achieve a
superior outcome for all of its members. It will be seen that in our two one-dimensional models conditionally
sincere voting coincides with sincere voting. Conditional sincerity is only important in the two-dimensional
model (Section 5).
7wages, throughout the paper we constrain w to be the same for all oﬃce holders. By π we
denote the consumption equivalent of all psychological rewards that accrue to a public-oﬃce
holder, such as the social status that is conferred to people in power (￿ego rents￿). For
now we treat π as independent of the oﬃce holder￿s type, but later we discuss the case in
which π is diﬀerent across types. Collection of the payoﬀ π + w is also contingent on the
provision of the indispensable amount of public good. If g∗ is not provided, oﬃce holders￿
utilities are again 0. This assumption makes sure that policy-makers will always choose to
provide the indispensable public good in the indispensable amount. The reader can think of
the consequences of not providing contract enforcement as so severe that it is impossible for
oﬃce holders to collect any payoﬀ, material or moral.
The key assumption of the model of competence is that, once in oﬃce, high-ability citizens
are more competent than low-ability ones, in the sense that they are able to provide the
indispensable public good at lower tax costs. In particular, we assume that the amount of
taxes that need to be raised to ￿nance the public good is decreasing in the percentage of
high-ability oﬃce-holders, ps. Formally, the government budget constraint can be written as
t = f(g∗,p s), where ∂f/∂ps < 0. Since g∗ is a constant, we can simply write t = t(ps), where
∂t/∂ps < 0. Private citizens, therefore, always prefer more high-ability oﬃce holders.9 We
explain later that our results hold even if private ability and public competence are less than
perfectly correlated. In order to simplify things, without loss of generality, we assume that
π + w − φ ≥ 1 − t(0) always.
3.1 Properties of the Political Equilibrium
Some general properties of the model are immediately apparent. First, if a citizen is a
candidate, she will always vote for herself. Candidacy requires an expenditure, and no citizen
will ￿nd it optimal to sustain this cost if she does not want to be elected (because of the
large number of positions to be ￿lled, there is no scope in this model for strategic use of
one￿s candidacy to aﬀect other candidates￿ election prospects). Second, citizens who are not
candidates (whatever their type) will always vote for a candidate of type s (high ability) if
9We have implicitly assumed that oﬃce holders do not pay taxes, so that the measure of tax payers is 1.
Thus, t denotes the individual as well as the total tax. This assumption leads to no loss of generality.
8given a chance. Denote by Ci the set and the measure of candidates of type i.A s l o n g a s
Cs is a non-empty set, each non-candidate will vote for a member of this set. Within this
set each voter chooses randomly and uniformly, and each voters￿ choice is independent of the
choice of other voters. Because low-quality policy-makers are better than no policy-makers
at all, when Cs is empty non-candidates vote for a random member of Cs.
Given the general properties of voting behavior, a prospective candidate of type i can
compute her probability of election, should she decide to run. Call Pi the probability that
a candidate of type i will succeed in being elected. The above discussion implies that any
equilibrium in which some oﬃces are ￿lled by low-quality citizens, or such that ps < 1, must
also feature Ps = 1 and Cs = psp. Non-candidates will always choose to vote for a candidate
of type s, so the measure of type-s candidates who receive strictly more votes than type-s
candidates is the minimum between Cs and the measure of non-candidates. Since the latter
are always in excess of p (because v>p )w ec a nh a v eps < 1o n l yi fCs <p , and in this case
all type-s candidates are certain of election. By the same token, any equilibrium featuring
ps =1m u s ti m p l yCs ≥ p and Ps = 0. In other words, there can be equilibria in which
unskilled candidates hold oﬃce if and only if voters are ￿rationed￿ in the number of high-
quality candidates (Cs <p ), in the sense that there are not enough candidates of high quality
to ￿ll all the elective oﬃces.10
Call θ the net rewards from holding oﬃce, θ ≡ π + w − φ. Given election probabilities,
an individual of type i will stand for oﬃce if and only if
Pi θ +( 1 − Pi)[λi − t(ps) − φ] ≥ λi − t(ps). (1)
The left-hand side is the expected return from running for oﬃce, which takes into account
the possibility of losing and having to return to private life, which pays oﬀ λi −t(ps)l e s st h e
cost of running φ. The right-hand side is the (certain) return from not running.
The properties of the resulting equilibrium are best analyzed with the help of Figure 1.
10If one removes the assumption that a measure v ∈ [p,1]o fc i t i z e n sh a v ei n ￿nite disutility from running,
then, for very high values of π, an equilibrium where everybody runs and votes for herself would also exist,
implying ps = s. Also note that the fact that weakly dominated strategies are eliminated, together with the
fact that φ is paid only if the measure of candidates is at least p, guarantees that ￿nobody runs￿ is not an
equilibrium.
9The horizontal axis measures ps, which obviously cannot exceed 1. On the vertical axis we
measure the net reward from holding oﬃce, θ, as well as the functions λ−t(ps)a n d1−t(ps),
which represent the payoﬀs for private citizens of high and low ability, respectively. Both
payoﬀ functions are increasing in ps, as private citizens are better oﬀ if ruled by competent
leaders who keep taxes low. Clearly the payoﬀ function for type s citizens is everywhere above
the payoﬀ function for type s citizens. We assume t(0) < 1 to simplify the picture. In the
￿gure we have also drawn the functions as straight lines and have assumed λ−t(0) > 1−t(1),
but nothing hinges on these restrictions. Each value of θ is associated with one and only one
equilibrium. Speci￿cally, as θ varies along the vertical axis, the equilibrium level of ps can
be read (inversely) oﬀ the solid locus that connects the intercepts of the two private-payoﬀ
functions, the upward sloping part of the type-s private-payoﬀ function, and the vertical line
through (1,0) above the type-s private-payoﬀ function. The rest of this section shows this
result, and provides some further characterization of the equilibria corresponding to diﬀerent
values of θ.L e t ￿ ss t a r ta tt h et o p .
If θ > λ−t(1), public life is more attractive than private life for everyone, irrespective of
ps. Here, the equilibrium cannot feature ps < 1. Suppose it did. Then we know that Ps =1
and Cs = psp, i.e., all the candidates of type s are being elected, and there are citizens of
type s who are not candidate. But with θ > λ − t(1), and, a fortiori, θ > λ − t(ps), any
high-ability private citizen has an incentive to deviate and run for oﬃce with certainty of
success. So, the equilibrium features ps =1 .S i n c eps =1 ,P s = 0, and no low-skill candidate
will waste φ on an election she has no chance of winning: Cs = 0. High-skill citizens strictly
prefer to be oﬃce holders, so the equilibrium will feature Cs >p .11
If λ−t(1) > θ, ps = 1 cannot be an equilibrium, as high-skill citizens would then strictly
prefer private life, and deviate by not running for oﬃce. Consider ￿rst the range of values
of θ between λ − t(0) and λ − t(1). An equilibrium in this range must feature ps < 1, and
consequently Ps = 1 and Cs = psp. In such an equilibrium high-ability agents must be






[λ − t(1) − φ]=λ − t(1).
It is easy to check that Cs is increasing in θ.For θ = λ−t(1),C s = p;a sθ increases, Cs eventually reaches its
maximum value, s(1 + p), and remains at this value for any higher θ (and (??) holds as an inequality).
10indiﬀerent between public and private life. If public life was more attractive all high-ability
citizens would want to deviate and be candidates, since they would be certain of election.
Similarly, if private returns were higher than public rewards, citizens would rather not run
for oﬃce. Hence, ps is determined by the condition θ = λ − t(ps), or,
ps = t−1(λ − θ) ≡ p∗
s(θ). (2)
p∗
s monotonically declines as θ falls from the upper to the lower level.12 For these values
of θ,h o l d i n go ﬃce pays oﬀ strictly better than being a low-skill private citizen, so that
these equilibria feature an ￿excess supply￿ of candidates of type s,o rCs(θ) > (1 − p∗
s(θ))p.
Contrary to standard intuition, in this range increases in the rewards from politics discourage
low-quality citizens from participating into politics. What is happening is that low-quality
c i t i z e n sw o u l da l w a y sl i k et ob ei no ﬃce, irrespective of the value of θ ( a sl o n ga si ti si n
this range). However, increases in θ increase the number of high-quality candidates, thereby
lowering the chances that any one low-skill citizen will win oﬃce. This observation will be
key to the path dependence result we derive below.13
Next, if λ − t(0) > θ ≥ 1 − t(0), all high-quality citizens strictly prefer private life, so
Cs = 0 and, necessarily, ps = 0. With ps = 0 all low-ability citizens continue to strictly
prefer public oﬃce to private life, and are willing to compete to ￿ll the p positions: Cs ≥ p.
On this range the measure of candidates is increasing in θ.I n c r e a s e s i n θ no longer aﬀect
the measure of high-skill candidates running (which remains constant at 0), but at the same
time they aﬀect the relative attractiveness of being in oﬃce relative to private life. At the
bottom of the range of variation, i.e., at θ =1− t(0), Cs = p.14
12Notice that p
∗
s(λ − t(1)) = 1. At the other extreme of the range, p
∗
s(λ − t(0)) = 0.












s(θ)) − φ]=1 − t(p
∗
s(θ)),
or Cs = p(1−p
∗
s(θ))(λ−1+φ)/φ, unless this solution exceeds the maximum number of potential candidates,
in which case Cs =( 1 − s)(1 + p − v). Hence Cs increases as θ falls, and ranges from 0 (when θ is at the top
of this range of variation) to a maximum of min{(1 − s)(1 + p − v),p(λ − 1 + φ)/φ} for the lowest value of θ
in this range.






[1 − t(0) − φ]=1 − t(0).
11We summarize and complete the ￿comparative statics￿ implied by the discussion so far
in the following
Results 1.i-1.iii. The competence of the elected body ps is
(i) increasing in the oﬃcial compensation w and the psychological reward π,
(ii) decreasing in the cost of campaigning φ,
(iii) decreasing in the opportunity cost λ;
Unlike quality, the composition of the population running for oﬃce is non-monotonic in
the various parameters. For low values of θ the measure of low-skill candidates is (weakly)
increasing in θ, and there are no high-skill candidates; the measure of low-skill candidates
reaches a maximum that depends on the size of the cost of running (it can potentially coincide
with the entire low-skill population with ￿nite campaigning cost), and then decreases with θ
when θ increases above λ − t(0). This is because more and more high-skill candidates join
the race in the latter range. Finally, for high enough θ there are only high-skill candidates.
We can further characterize the response of ps to changes in parameters by considering the
response of equilibrium quality to changes in the importance of quality itself. When t(0) is
very low, private life under incompetent rulers is quite hard, and this tends to encourage high-
quality participation in politics. On the other hand, when t is very responsive to changes in
quality, a small representation of high-quality citizens in the elected body assures suﬃciently
large private utility that high-quality citizens are content with private life. To turn these
observations into a simple comparative static result we consider a simple special case:
Results 1.iv-1.v. If t(ps)=αe−βps (α ∈ (0,1), β > 0), then it is also true that ps is
(iv) increasing in the incompetence of low-skill citizens α = t(0),a n d
(v) decreasing in the marginal eﬀect of the competence of high-skill citizens β.
An additional comparative statics result follows from a straightforward extension in which
the cost of campaigning φ (or, equivalently, the psychological bene￿ts from oﬃce π) has a
continuous (instead of dichotomous) distribution G(φ). In this model equilibrium is described
by cut-oﬀ values φ∗
s,a n dφ∗
s, such that members of each of the two groups with campaigning
costs less than the cut-oﬀ are candidates and the others are not. In an interior equilibrium,
From this Cs =m i n {(1 − s)(1 + p − v),p/φ(θ − 1 + t(0) + φ)}.
12where 0 <p s < 1, ps and φ∗
s are jointly determined by the conditions
π + w − φ∗
s = λ − t(ps)





(demand equals supply). It is then immediate to derive the following result:
Result 1.vi. The competence of the elected body, ps, is decreasing in the number of seats
(per capita) p.
Since the number of high-quality individuals seeking oﬃce is independent of the number
of seats, a larger assembly implies that quality will be more diluted.15 All the monotonicities
implied by Result 1 are to be understood as weak.
Is this model successful at capturing the idea that otherwise-identical countries might
experience diﬀerent outcomes in the competence of their political leaders? It depends on the
properties of the rewards from oﬃce. If π+w is an exogenous constant, then the equilibrium
is unique, and it is identi￿ed in Figure 1 by the intersection of the solid locus with a horizontal
line through the point (0,θ). Countries with high-quality policymakers are countries that have
￿better￿ parameters, in the sense of Proposition ??. Some of these predictions are potentially
testable (especially with regards to p) ,a n dw ep l a nt op u r s u et h e mi nf u t u r ew o r k .W et h i n k
these results are interesting in their own right, but in the remainder of this section we show
that when θ is endogenous there can be multiple equilibrium levels of ps,a n dt h a tw h e nw
is endogenous there can be path dependence in the equilibrium value of ps. Hence, countries
that are identical in all respects may experience diﬀerent levels of policymaking competence
if they are at diﬀerent equilibria or if they had diﬀerent initial conditions.
3.2 Multiple Equilibria
We think it highly plausible that the psychological rewards from holding elective oﬃce depend
positively on the average quality of the policymaking class, i.e., that π depends positively on
15A detailed treatment of this extension is available upon request. We have chosen to present the simpler
model because it lends itself to the graphical representation of Figure 1.
13ps or π = π(ps). It is well known in sociology that one￿s social status is heavily in￿uenced
by one￿s profession. In turn, the social status enjoyed by a professional group depends on
the average quality of the group itself. If a politician cares about his social status he must
care about the average quality of his colleagues. An additional source of positive dependence
springs from the highly collaborative (or at least interactive) nature of policymaking. Much
as high-quality university professors derive direct utility bene￿ts from interacting with good
colleagues (aside from the indirect bene￿ts associated with higher productivity from human-
capital externalities), politicians might be presumed to prefer dealing with other politicians
of similar type.16
Without loss of generality, assume that w = φ,s ot h a tθ = π. The analysis of the previous
section readily implies that
Result 2. If π0(ps) > 0 multiple equilibria in the competence of the elected body ps are
possible.
Essentially, there is an equilibrium for each intersection of the π(ps) function with the solid
locus in Figure 1. Figure 2a provides an example in which π(ps)i sl i n e a r( π(ps)=π0+π1ps).
If π0 < λ − t(0) and λ − t(1) < π0 + π1, there are three equilibria. One equilibrium is
ps =1 , another is ps =0 , and the third is given by the intersection between the π(ps) line
and the λ − t(ps) curve. This last equilibrium is unstable. Figure 2b provides an example
in which π(ps) is S-shaped, so that all three equilibria feature ps s t r i c t l yb e t w e e n0a n d1 .
More generally, we have shown that with π endogenous there can be any (odd) number of
equilibria.17
16There are also some material rewards that might be increasing in average quality. For example, many
former oﬃce holders are invited to sit on corporate boards, become partners of law ￿rms, or act as high-
pro￿le lobbyists. Again, if the political class is held in disrepute it is less likely for such practices to become
widespread. On post-oﬃce ￿nancial rewards see also Alesina and Spear (1988).
17As we show below, our results are broadly robust to making π type-speci￿c, i.e., to a generalization in
which the rewards from oﬃce are πs(ps)f o rt y p e - s citizens and πs(ps)f o rt y p e - s citizens. However, in this
perfect-information world some readers might ￿nd it unappealing that the rewards depend on ps at all: if
types are perfectly observed, then ￿nancial and psychological rewards (though not ￿consumption￿ rewards)
might conceivably be completely independent of other oﬃce holders￿ types. However, we also show below that
all our basic results go through if we introduce asymmetric information on types. In this case all that voters
know is ps, while they only have a noisy signal on each individual politician￿s type. Hence, the dependence of
143.3 Path Dependence
Another step towards a more realistic model is to endogenize the wage component of the
payoﬀs from holding elective oﬃce, w. We start by making explicit the cost and bene￿ts of
changes in w, and relating the model with variable w to the model of the previous sections.
For simplicity, here we set π = φ so that θ = w.I n c r e a s e si nw bene￿to ﬃce holders, whose
payoﬀ is w, but ￿ abstracting from the indirect eﬀect through the quality of the elective body
￿ potentially hurt private citizens who have to pay higher taxes.18 Denoting by τ(w)t h e
amount of taxes that needs to be raised to pay the p oﬃce holders a salary of w,t h ep a y o ﬀ
function for private citizens of type j becomes λj − t(ps) − τ(w). De￿ne θ(w) the function
w+τ(w). It should be clear that everything we have said in the previous sub-sections about
the equilibrium relationship between θ and ps will apply now to the relationship between θ(w)
and ps.I np a r t i c u l a r ,a sθ(w) increases, the associated equilibrium value of ps is unique, and
it is identi￿ed by the solid locus in Figure 1, where we now measure θ(w)o nt h ev e r t i c a l
axis. Clearly θ(w) is increasing in w,s oa sw varies the entire menu of potential equilibria is
feasible.19
We now turn to the task of endogenizing w. T h es i m p l e s tw a yt od os oi st om a k et h e
model dynamic, and to assume that the wage of oﬃce holders at time t is decided ￿ by
majority voting ￿ by the oﬃce holders at time t−1. The population of citizens is the same in
every period, and all citizens are in￿nitely lived. In each period the citizen-candidate game
is the one analyzed above, with the diﬀerence that agents maximize a present-discounted
value of expected pro￿ts. The elective body decides on next period￿s wages at the end of its
tenure, after the public good is provided and taxes are collected. Note that with this simple
structure wt is the only state variable. This insures that within each period ￿ conditional on
π (or πs)o nps appears fully justi￿ed.
18We hasten to add that none of the results of this section depend on the preceived costs ￿ in terms of higher
taxes ￿ of increasing oﬃce holders￿ salaries. While we model such costs explicitly for the sake of precision,
everything would go through if τ(w)=0 .
19The government-budget constraint is taxes = f(g
∗,w,p s). The discussion above implies that we are
assuming that f is separable: f(g
∗,w,p s)=t(ps)+τ(w). This assumption makes the model tractable, but
we think that the intuition for the conclusions of this subsection would be robust to a more general approach.
Below we further assume that τ(0) = 0.
15wt ￿ the equilibrium outcome is determined exactly as indicated in the previous paragraph.
In particular, higher choices for wt lead (weakly) to higher equilibrium values of ps,t. Hence,
all that is required is to analyze the wage-setting game at the end of period t.
The elective body at time t is constituted by (at most) two types of citizens, s and
s. Individuals of the same type have identical expected payoﬀ functions. Assuming away
coordination problems all individuals of the same type will therefore vote for the same level
of wt+1. Hence, if high-ability types are in a majority in the elective body, i.e., if ps,t > 1
2,
wt+1 will maximize the expected payoﬀ of high-ability oﬃce holders. If low-ability individuals
are in the majority, or ps,t < 1
2, the wage maximizes expected payoﬀs for type-s oﬃce holders.
Furthermore, since tenure in oﬃce ends at the end of period t,t h er e l e v a n tp a y o ﬀ function
for a time-t oﬃce holder of type j coincides with the payoﬀ function of any citizen of type j.
It will be useful to denote by w the level below which no high-ability citizen is willing to
run for oﬃce, i.e., the level at and below which Cs = ps = 0. From the previous subsections
this level is implicitly de￿ned by θ(w)=λ − t(0), or
w = λ − t(0) − τ(w).
Similarly, de￿ne w the level of the wage at which exactly p high-ability citizens run for oﬃce,
i.e., the case in which Cs = p and ps = 1. Again from the previous subsections w is implicitly
de￿ned by the condition
w = λ − t(1) − τ(w).
Finally, de￿ne w the level above which all high-ability citizens strictly prefer running for
oﬃce, or at and above which Cs = s(1 + p − v)a n dps =1 . 20 Clearly, w>w>w .
Starting with the case in which ps,t > 1
2, consider a choice of wt+1 such that w <w t+1 ≤ w.
This would imply 0 <p s,t+1 < 1. We know that in this region high-ability citizens who run
for oﬃc ea r ea s s u r e do fe l e c t i o na n di n d i ﬀerent between holding public oﬃce and being
private citizens, so the expected utility of a citizen of high ability is simply wt+1.S i n c e
20This is given by:
p





s(1 + p − v)
¶
(λ − t(1) − τ(w) − φ)=λ − t(1) − τ(w)
where the left-hand side is the expected payoﬀ from being a candidate for oﬃce when every other high-ability
citizen is a candidate for oﬃce, and the right-hand side is the payoﬀ of being a private citizen.
16this is increasing in wt+1, wt+1 < w cannot be an optimal choice for next period￿s wage
from the point of view of a high-ability majority. Now consider a choice of wt+1 such that
w ≥ wt+1 > w, implying ps,t+1 = 1. Here high-ability citizens are indiﬀerent between running
for (as opposed to holding) oﬃce and being private citizens, so the expected utility of a high-
ability citizen is λ − t(1) − τ(wt+1). Since this is decreasing in wt+1, wt+1 > w cannot
maximize the utility of high-ability citizens either. The perverse cases in which the preferred
choice for wt+1 for high-ability policymakers is above w or below w can be ruled out with
mild parametric restrictions.21
Now suppose that ps,t < 1
2,s ot h a twt+1 maximizes the expected utility of a low-ability
citizen. Our goal is to show that low-ability citizens in the majority at time t may choose
a wt+1 diﬀerent from w, the optimal choice for a high-ability majority. Hence, we limit
ourselves to providing an example in which this does indeed happen. Suppose, then, that
parameters are such that Cs =( 1− s)(1 − p − v)a tw. In other words, when the wage is
w, the entire low-ability population runs for oﬃce.22 The expected utility of a low-ability
citizen is then
ηw +( 1− η)[1− t(0) − τ(w) − φ],
where η = p/[(1 −s)(1 +p−v)] is the probability of election when all (and only) low-ability
21The restriction to rule out choices above w is τ
0(w) >p / [s(1+p−v)−p]f o rw>w and simply says that
the cost for tax payers of very high wages to politicians grows ￿fast enough￿ at high levels of the wage to more
than oﬀset the gains to the select few that make it into oﬃce. To eliminate choices below w ￿rst notice that
in this range high-ability citizens￿ utility is maximized by setting w = 0. The condition for a global maximum
at w is therefore λ − t(1) − τ(w) > λ − t(0).
22It follows from the previous-subsections that Cs is (weakly) increasing in w for w< w , and (weakly)
decreasing for w> w . Hence, if there are values of w such that Cs includes the entire population, w is one of
these values. In terms of the parameter space, the restriction we are imposing is that (1 − s)(1 + p − v) <
p(λ − 1 + φ)/φ and use the fact that p
∗
s(w) = 0). If there are no such values of w,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c eo fwt+1
for low-ability citizens could still be diﬀerent from w, potentially leading to path dependence, although for
diﬀerent reasons: in that case utility at w is 1 − t(0)−τ(w), which could be more than 1 − t(1) − τ(w)i ft a x
savings on wage payments are large enough. We do not emphasize this case because it has limited empirical
relevance. It might appear disturbing that a (meaningful) path dependence result only emerges when all
low-quality citizens run for oﬃc e .W eh a v ev e r i ￿ed, however, that in the more general model in which φ (or
π) takes a continuum of values with distribution G the path dependence result easily emerges irrespective of
whether all or only some of the low-quality citizens compete for oﬃce.
17citizens run for oﬃce. None of the parametric assumptions we have imposed so far prevents
this quantity from exceeding 1 − t(1) − τ(w), which is a low-ability citizen￿s utility when
elected oﬃcials￿ wages are set at w. Hence, w cannot be an optimal choice of wt+1 for a
low-ability majority at time t. Furthermore, choices above w are immediately ruled out by
noting that in this region a low-ability citizen￿s utility is 1−t(1)−τ(w). Hence, we conclude
that the optimal wage for a low-ability majority, which we will denote by wl,i ss t r i c t l yl e s s
than the optimal wage for a high-ability majority, w. Finally, suppose that the equilibrium
associated with wl features a low-ability majority, i.e., ps,t < 1/2f o rwt = wl.23
To see how the model generates path dependence, imagine that at the time of birth of
the polity, time 0, the initial wage, w0, is selected randomly, before the ￿rst citizen-candidate
game is played. It follows from the discussion above that if ps(w0) > 1/2t h e￿rst assembly
will set w1 = w, with the consequence that ps,1 =1 . W ew o u l dt h e nh a v ewt = w, ps,t =1
for every t>0. Instead, if p∗
s(w0) < 1/2, we will have wt = wl, ps,t < 1/2 for every t. This is
our
Result 3. Path Dependence in the competence of the elected body, ps, is possible. If there is
path dependence, and ps(w0) ≤ 1/2,t h e nps ∈ [0,1/2] for every t>0.I fps(w0) > 1/2,t h e n
ps =1for every t>0.
Hence, when historical accident determines that a country￿s initial political leadership
is composed by high-ability citizens, this ￿luck￿ tends to persist as the initial policymakers
(and all their successors) set rewards so as to insure that subsequent participants in the
political process continue to be of high quality. Instead, if initially policymakers are of low
quality, then this bad luck tends to persist, as low-quality policymakers set rewards so as to
discourage competition for oﬃce from high-quality ones. In Appendix 1 we study a special
case in detail.
23Notice that wl is not necessarily set to maximize the period t + 1 payoﬀ function of low-ability citizens.
For, de￿ne the wage that maximizes one-period-ahead payoﬀs￿ w, and suppose that ps(￿ w) > 1/2( a si tm a y
well be, all we know so far is that ￿ w<w, and hence ps(￿ w) <p s(w)=1.) Then the low-quality majority faces
at r a d e - o ﬀ in which maximizing one-period-ahead payoﬀsl e a d st oapermanent loss of majority ￿ i.e., wτ = w
for every τ ≥ t + 2. In this case, they might choose to set wl < ￿ w in order to preserve their majority. Of
course, if ps(￿ w) ≤ 1/2 then they will set wl =￿ w.
183.4 Extensions
One appealing feature of the framework developed above is that it does not invoke uncertainty
or asymmetric information to generate equilibria in which voters elect low-ability politicians.
Rather, voters have no illusions as to the intrinsic qualities of the candidates, but elect them
because they are ￿rationed￿ in high-quality candidates. In this subsection, however, we brie￿y
check that our results are robust to the addition of asymmetric information. Also, we have
assumed that market skills and policy-making competence are perfectly correlated. We brie￿y
discuss the case in which the correlation is imperfect. Finally, we analyze what happens when
rewards from oﬃce are type speci￿c. Our results are robust to all these extensions.
Assume that a candidate￿s type is imperfectly observable. Citizens receive a signal about
other people￿s types. Speci￿cally, assume that if a candidate is of type i af r a c t i o nf>0.5
of the population believes that she is of type i, and the remaining 1 − f have the wrong
b e l i e f . C o n s i d e rt h e nas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hCs > 0, and Cs > 0. As before, each candidate
will vote for herself. How will non-candidates vote? Clearly each non-candidate will give her
vote to a candidate chosen randomly from the set she believes to be of high quality. Each
high-quality candidate is believed to be such by a fraction f of the non-candidates, and will
therefore receive f ∗ 100 percent of the votes. Each low-quality candidate will receive only
(1−f)∗100 percent of the votes. Type-s candidates will therefore always receive more votes
than s types. Hence, if Cs ≥ p we have ps =1a n dCs =0 ,a n di fCs <pall the high-quality
candidates are elected for sure. This means that the analysis is identical to the one with
perfect information.
Suppose now that market productivity λi and competence when making economic-policy
decisions were only imperfectly correlated, so that there can be some individuals with low
market potential but high return in oﬃce. Under perfect information this group of people ￿
provided it is not too small ￿ would form a perfect group of candidates: they require little
incentive to seek oﬃce, and they perform well once there. A ￿Bad-Politicians￿ equilibrium
would be diﬃcult to sustain. However, if market and policy-making abilities are allowed
to diﬀer, the assumptions on information become crucial. To see this, consider the more
realistic case in which voters observe the market productivity of a candidate (what she did
before running for oﬃce) but do not observe ￿ at the moment of voting ￿ her policy-making
19ability. Then, as long as market and policy-making skills are positively correlated, voters
will always choose candidates with high private ability over those with low private ability.
This broadly restores the conclusions of the previous subsections, with the quali￿cation that
ps = 1 can no longer occur, as a fraction of the elected body will always be constituted by
high-private but low-public ability citizens.
Another robustness check involves the case in which the rewards from oﬃce diﬀer ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h eo ﬃce holder￿s type. Speci￿cally, suppose that competent oﬃce holders receive
rewards πs, while incompetent ones receive πs,w i t hπs and πs both potentially functions
of ps. By a line of reasoning similar to the one developed above one sees that the locus
of potential equilibria is once again limited to the solid collection of lines and segments in
Figure 1, with the vertical coordinate to be interpreted as a value of πs.D i ﬀerently from
the common-π case, however, not all intersections of the πs function and the solid locus are
equilibria. Speci￿cally, for intersections involving ps < 1, equilibrium obtains if and only if
type-s citizens weakly prefer public oﬃce to private life, i.e., if πs(ps) ≥ 1 − t(ps). If not,
the positions left available for oﬃce cannot be ￿lled. Note that this requirement is always
ful￿lled if πs ≥ πs, but in general it can be ful￿lled even if πs < πs. We conclude that our
basic results survive the extension in which rewards from oﬃce are type speci￿c.
4 Corruption
A set of results analogous to the ones we have developed for the model of policy-making
competence can be derived in the context of a model of corruption. As before, we assume
that there are two types of citizens, honest, or h, and dishonest, or h.T y p eh is present in the
population with measure h(1 +p)a n dt y p eh with measure (1 −h)(1+p). We denote by ph
the fraction of oﬃce holders who are of type h. As before, we assume 1−v>h (1+p−v) >p .
All citizens have the same ability. As long as a measure p of political oﬃces are ￿lled, and
the oﬃce holders provide the indispensable public good, private citizens enjoy a gross income
of λ. If the public good is not provided, private income is 0. Since competence is the same
for all policymakers, we normalize the taxes required to pay for the public good to 0.
The basic diﬀerence from the model of competence is that with corruption the payoﬀs
from holding public oﬃce are endogenous, and depend on a decentralized decision by each
20individual oﬃc eh o l d e r . W ea s s u m et h a tt h ep a y o ﬀ function for a politician i of type j
is π + w + σjbi. π + w is ￿ as before ￿ the reward that is exogenous to the individual
policymaker (collected as long as g = g∗). bi measures the expected resources obtained by
harassing citizens and requiring kickbacks and bribes. σj is the exogenous parameter by which
we introduce heterogeneity in this model. Our assumption is that σh = 0, while σh =1 . I n
other words, type-h citizens are high-quality because they are honest: they derive no utility
bene￿t from collecting bribes. Instead, oﬃce holders of type h are dishonest: they derive the
same utility bene￿ts from resources obtained by legitimate and illegitimate means.24
A tractable way to analyze the decentralized decision of politicians is to assume that each
citizen i must interact with one oﬃce holder, and the oﬃce holder can exploit this interaction
to extract bribes. If citizen i is required to pay a bribe bi his utility is then: λ − bi.D e n o t e
the maximum bribe a politician can collect from a citizen by ﬂ b. To interpret this maximum,
one can think of a politician as facing a ￿Laﬀer curve￿ by which the returns from bribe-taking
are ￿rst increasing and then decreasing. Once in oﬃce, the optimal bribe taking of a type h
politician is 0.25 As long as π does not depend on the bribe-taking activity of any individual
oﬃce holder, instead, a dishonest oﬃce holder will always maximize her revenues, thereby
setting bi = ﬂ b for each citizen i he gets to victimize. Then a private citizen always prefers to
be paired with a honest politician, and since the chance of this happening is increasing in ph,
non-candidate voters will always give their preference, if given a chance, to honest candidates.
We conclude that, as in the previous section, equilibria with ph < 1 must be associated with
Ph =1a n dCh = php, and equilibria with ph = 1 must feature Ph = Ch = 0. Note that each
politician expects to engage in 1/p interactions. Hence, bi = b/p.
The model is summarized by Figure 3. The upward sloping line is the function phλ+(1−
ph)(λ −ﬂ b), which represents the (common) expected utility of private citizens as a function
of the fraction of oﬃce holders who are honest.26 On the vertical axis we measure the reward
24The qualitative results don￿t change if one changes the assumptions on the parameter σ




25We are implicitly assuming that bribe collection involves a transaction cost ε to be borne by the politician.
26It is easy to extend this model to one in which dishonest citizens prefer dishonest oﬃce-holders. As long
as the diﬀerence between a dishonest and a honest citizen￿s utilities is small relative to the diﬀerence between
a dishonest and a honest oﬃce-holder￿s utility, nothing changes in our results. We do not emphasize this
extension because we do not think it is very realistic. If the number of voters who would potentially prefer
21θ = π + w − φ. The solid locus describes the equilibrium value of ph as θ varies. If θ is
above λ then honest citizens strictly prefer to be in oﬃce, so ph =1 . I fλ − ﬂ b ≤ θ < λ the
corresponding equilibrium value of ph obtains when honest citizens are indiﬀerent between
private life and public oﬃce, namely when:
ph =




Since all the non-candidates prefer to vote for a honest politician, all the honest citizens who
are candidates get elected, so exactly php honest citizens are candidate. When θ falls below
λ −ﬂ b the equilibrium features ph =0 . 27
The structure of equilibria is therefore the same as in the model of competence, with a
(weakly) monotone relationship between rewards from oﬃce θ and policymakers￿ quality ph.
If θ is an exogenous constant the equilibrium is unique. The relevant comparative statics are
summarized by the following proposition.
Results 1’.i-1’.v. The honesty of the elected body ph is
(i) increasing in the oﬃcial compensation w and in the psychological reward π,
(ii) decreasing in the cost of campaigning φ,
(iii) decreasing in the opportunity cost λ,
(iv) increasing in the cost of corruption b,
(v) decreasing in the number of seats (per capita) p.
Suppose now that the social status and ￿legitimate￿ private ￿nancial rewards from holding
oﬃce depend on the perceived general honesty of politicians. Formally, call δh the fraction
of oﬃce holders who do not ask bribes, and assume that π = π(δh), π0(δh) > 0. Note that
whatever the value of δh,ad i s h o n e s to ﬃce holder will always set b = ﬂ b (thereby con￿rming
our conjecture), because her marginal impact on δh is 0. Hence, δh = ph, and we could
represent π as an upward sloping function in Figure 3. Then we have
a dishonest oﬃce-holder is large enough to matter for electoral outcomes, then it is likely that competition
among these dishonest citiznes will result in oﬃce-holders capturing all the rents from the corruption activity.
But this contradicts the assumption that dishonest citizens prefer dishonest policymakers. For discussions of
t h ei n d u s t r i a lo r g a n i z a t i o no fc o r r u p t i o ns e eR o s e - A c k e r m a n( 1978) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
27In analogy with the previous section, we assume for simplicity that θ +ﬂ b/p ≥ λ −ﬂ b always.
22Result 2’. Multiple equilibria in the honesty of the elected body ph are possible.
Equilibria correspond to intersections of the function π(•) with the function representing
private payoﬀs. When the social status of politicians is low because most politicians are
corrupt, then few honest individuals are willing to participate in politics.
One might have thought that an upward sloping π function would have been suﬃcient to
obtain multiple equilibria in corruption even without heterogeneity in honesty. In this model
this is not true. If politicians are all potentially corrupt, they will all individually set bi = ﬂ b/p,
irrespective of the amount of bribes being collected in the economy. The key insight is that
honest behavior on the part of a large number of politicians induces free riding behavior in
each individual member of the elite, and it therefore leads to underprovision of honesty. This
is not to say that one cannot write models of multiplicity of equilibria in corruption in which
there is no heterogeneity in honesty ￿ in fact, we believe it can be done 28 ￿b u ts i m p l yt h a t
ar e w a r df u n c t i o nt h a ti si n c r e a s i n gi nδh is not enough.
When the model is made dynamic and wt is endogenous there is again an incentive for
dishonest policymakers to set a low wage in order to discourage honest candidates from
running for oﬃce. So let us again set π = φ, and consequently θ = w. Taking taxes into
account, the payoﬀ function for private citizens is λ−τ(w)−(1−ph)b.C o n t i n u i n gt od e ￿ne
θ(w) the function w +τ(w), the locus of possible equilibria of the within-period game is still
given by Figure 3, with θ(w) on the vertical axis. Once again, a high-quality majority will
maximize the welfare of high-quality citizens, while a low-quality majority will care about
low-quality citizens. We also re-de￿ne the threshold wages w and w appropriately for the
corruption model:
w = λ − τ(w) − b.
w = λ − τ(w).
It should be clear that a high-quality majority at time t will always set wt+1 = w.T h e
argument is the same used in Section 3.3. But again it is possible to construct an example in
which a low-quality majority would choose a diﬀerent value. In particular, if C¯ h =( 1−h)(1+
p−v)a tw, the expected payoﬀ for low-quality citizens is η(w+ﬂ b/p)+ ( 1 −η)(λ−ﬂ b−τ(w)−φ),
28Cadot (1987), Andvig and Moene (1990), and Tirole (1996) (who provides an instance of path dependence)
obtain multiple equilibria in models of bureaucratic corruption withn homogeneous agents.
23which may well exceed λ − τ(w), i.e., the payoﬀ associated with a choice of w. Hence ﬂ w is
not the choice of a corrupt majority. This makes it possible for path dependence to set in,
a n da l l o w su st os t a t e
Result 3’. Path Dependence in the honesty of the elected body, ph, is possible. If there is
path dependence, and ph(w0) ≤ 1/2,t h e nph ∈ [0,1/2] for every t>0.I fph(w0) > 1/2,t h e n
ph =1for every t>0.
5 Competence and Honesty Together
This section extends the results of the previous two sections to the case in which the popu-
lation is heterogeneous in both ability and honesty. We assume that ability and honesty are
arbitrarily correlated in the population. The population continues to have measure 1 + p,
with p the measure holding oﬃce. A proportion s of the population has high ability and the
rest has low ability, in the sense of Section 3. In each ability group, a fraction h is honest and
the rest is dishonest, in the sense of Section 4. A fraction phs of the oﬃce holders has high
ability and is honest. A fraction phs is honest but of low ability. A fraction phs is dishonest
and skilled, and a fraction phs is dishonest and has low ability. We assume hs(1 + p) >p ,
(1−h)s(1+p) >p , h(1−s)(1+p) >p ,a n d( 1−h)(1−s)(1+p) >pso that phs =1 ,p hs =1 ,
phs = 1 and phs = 1 are all feasible.
De￿ne ph ≡ phs + phs the fraction of politicians who are honest and ps = phs + phs the
fraction with high skill. Clearly both of these quantities have a maximum at 1, and they are
both 1 only when all politicians are of type hs. The utility experienced by a private citizen
i is increasing in her ability λi, in the fraction of oﬃce holders who have high ability, and in
the fraction who are honest:
Ui = λi − t(ps) − (1 − ph)b. (4)
The utility experienced by an elected public oﬃcer who is honest (i.e., of type hj)i sθ =
π+w−φ, which we treat as outside of her control, albeit potentially endogenous. Because π
is likely to depend on (ps, ph), we will write θ(ps,p h). The utility experienced by an elected
public oﬃcer who is dishonest (of type hj)i sθ + b/p > θ.
24Now consider the space (ph,p s). The utility functions Ui can be represented in this space
by indiﬀerence curves, one set for each of the two skill types. These indiﬀerence curves are
downward sloping and, if t(ps) is convex, they are convex too (the linear and concave cases
lead to similar results). We also note that the indiﬀerence curves of skilled and honest citizens
coincide with those of skilled and dishonest; so do the indiﬀerence curves of unskilled citizens.
Notice that the indiﬀerence curves of skilled and unskilled are parallel. Honest citizens will
be indiﬀerent between public and private life if
θ(ph,p s)=λi − t(ps) − (1 − ph)b. (5)
This equation de￿nes, in the (ph,p s) space, a ￿occupational indiﬀerence curve￿ (henceforth
OIC), which indicates the locus of pairs (ph,p s) such that citizen i is indiﬀerent between
private and political life. For now we impose no restrictions on these OICs. Note that, in the
special case in which θ is a constant, the OICs exactly overlay the utility indiﬀerence curves
described in the previous paragraph: i.e., for each level of θ the OIC exactly coincides with
the utility indiﬀerence curve (UIC) corresponding to a level of utility θ. OICs for dishonest
individuals can be analogously introduced as the locus satisfying:
θ(ph,p s)+ﬂ b = λi − t(ps) − (1 − ph)b. (6)
For pairs (ph,p s) on one side of her OIC a citizen prefers to be a oﬃce holder, while for points
on the other side she prefers to be a private citizen.
Clearly there are four OICs: for honest and competent citizens (hs), dishonest but com-
petent (hs), honest but incompetent (hs), and dishonest and incompetent (hs). A crucial
property of the two-dimensional model is that these OICs do not intersect. For by now fa-
miliar reasons, honest-skilled individuals have the most to lose and the least to gain from
political careers, so the region of the space (ph,p s) in which they prefer private life must be
the largest. Whenever (ph,p s) are such that an hs type (weakly) prefers to be in oﬃce, then
all other types strictly prefer to be in oﬃce. The relative sizes of the regions in which types
hs and hs prefer public oﬃce is in general ambiguous. Assume, to ￿x ideas, that b/p > λ−1
(very little changes in the alternative scenario). Then, whenever (ph,p s)i ss u c ht h a ths
individuals (weakly) prefer to hold oﬃce then all hs and hs individuals strictly prefer to hold
25public oﬃce. Finally, whenever hs types prefer oﬃce, so do hs. hs citizens prefer private life
for the smallest set of values of (ph,p s).
Some equilibrium properties are immediate. First, non-candidate voters strictly prefer
candidates of type hs to all other types. Hence, in any equilibrium featuring phs < 1w em u s t
have (extending the notation from the previous sections) Phs =1a n dChs = phsp. Similarly,
if phs =1w em u s th a v ePij = Cij =0 ,∀ij 6= hs. Also, candidates of type hs will receive
only their own vote whenever candidates of other types are in the running.
Figure 4 depicts the (ph,p s) plane. The vertical and horizontal lines through the point
(1,1) delimit the feasible set (the point (1,1) is reached when phs =1 ) .T h e￿gure also depicts
the line ps + ph = 1, to which we will refer to as the ￿diagonal.￿ The interpretation of this
line is to characterize the feasible set when phs = 0, i.e., when any increase in honesty must
be ￿paid￿ with a loss of competence. In other words, the line shows the best the economy
can do when its best citizens are not in politics. The ￿gure also shows a map of indiﬀerence
curves, under the assumption that these have slope steeper than 45 degrees when they hit
the top side of the feasible set and slope less than 45 degrees when they hit the right side
of the set (the two alternative cases can be easily dealt with along the same lines we￿ll use
here). Then each UIC has one point at which its slope is -45 degrees. Figure 4 shows the
curve that connects all these points, called the 45 curve. The 45 curve is continuous and
upward sloping. We claim that the set of potential equilibria is restricted to the solid locus
in the ￿gure, namely the point (1,1 ) ,t h ep a r to ft h e4 5c u r v et ot h er i g h to ft h ed i a g o n a l ,
the part of the diagonal to the left of the 45 curve, and the vertical axis.29 We prove this
result in Appendix 2.
More speci￿cally, we prove that the model features an equilibrium for any intersection of
the hs OIC with the 45 curve above the diagonal, any intersection of the hs OIC with the
diagonal above the 45 curve, and any intersection of the hs OIC with the vertical axis. In
addition, there is an equilibrium at (1,1) if this point lies ￿below￿ the hs OIC. Also (0,0) is
an equilibrium if it lies ￿above￿ the hs OIC ￿ i.e., if at this point these individuals strictly
prefer private life to public oﬃce ￿ and ￿below￿ the OIC for citizens of type hs.
29If ﬂ b/p < λ − 1 then the set of potential equilibira is given by the point (1,1), the part of the 45 curve to
the right of the diagonal, the part of the diagonal to the right of the 45 curve, and the horizontal axis.
26Given the above characterization the model is consistent with any number of equilibria,
f r o m0t oi n ￿nity, depending on the shape and position of the OICs of the various types. As
in the previous two models, if θ is an exogenous constant the equilibrium is always unique.
For, each of the OICs of the three types endowed with quality intersects the relevant portion
of the solid locus in Figure 4 at most once, and intersection by one precludes intersection by
the other two. Furthermore, whenever there is an equilibrium strictly within the feasible set,
the points (1,1) and (0,0) cannot be equilibria.
The comparative statics are completely in line with Results 1 and 1￿ in the upward
sloping part of the equilibrium locus. Here honesty and competence are positively correlated.
Interestingly, on the other hand, in the downward sloping segment we obtain some new
predictions. In this region a local increase in θ leads to an increase in honesty (ph), but a fall
in competence (ps). The intuition is that in such equilibria voters are constrained in honesty,
but not in competence. The convexity of the indiﬀerence curve says that voters would prefer
to move down and to the right on the diagonal. Citizens of type sh are certain of election
and indiﬀerent between public and private life, and citizens of type sh strictly prefer private
life. An increase in θ increases the measure of hs (but not hs) candidates, allowing voters to
replace some hs with hs oﬃce holders. Similarly, in this region an increase in b will bring about
increased honesty accompanied by reduced competence. Always in this region, a paradoxical
result is that an increase in the incompetence of low-ability citizens, as measured by t(0),
leads to a decline in competence. The intuition is that increased incompetence increases type
hs citizens￿ desire to be in oﬃce (to avoid the consequences of their own ineptitude), and this
shifts their OIC to the right, leading once again to an increase in ph accompanied by a fall in
ps. By a similar paradox, always in this downward sloping region, equilibrium competence
increases if the skilfulness of high-ability citizens at lowering taxes increases. More generally,
along this downward sloping segment honesty and competence are negatively correlated.
On the vertical segment of the equilibrium locus the elected body is formed exclusively
by citizens of types hs and hs. Here local increases in θ have the standard eﬀect of increasing
quality (ps goes up, ph is unchanged). Changes in λ or in the parameters of t(•)h a v et h e
same eﬀects as in Result 1. More interestingly, an increase in the cost of corruption b makes
holding oﬃce more appealing to hs and shifts their OIC upward. As a result, voters can
27replace some hs with some hs policymaker, so that ps increases while ph does not change
(though the ￿corruption bill￿ increases due to the increase in b). In this region competence
and honesty are uncorrelated.
Even in the two-dimensional case multiplicity of equilibria requires that θ is endogenous,
a n da ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fph and ps. Recall that in this case it is no longer true that the
OICs exactly lie over some UICs. In fact, there is no restriction whatsoever on the shape of
the OICs: they could be decreasing, increasing, non-monotonic, and even backward bending.
In this case, if the OIC for the hs has upward sloping portions, it might well intersect the
segment of the 45 curve above the diagonal more than once. If the OIC for the hs has
downward sloping portions, it might well intersect the segment of the diagonal above the 45
c u r v em o r et h a no n c e .T h eO I Cf o rt h ehs might well hit the vertical axis more than once also.
The key conclusion is, therefore, that it is perfectly possible for otherwise identical countries
to be on diﬀerent equilibria and to ￿nd no cross-country correlation between honesty and
ability.30
6 Conclusions
We have investigated the mechanisms that lead to the selection of citizens of varying quality
into political life. Countries may ￿nd themselves stuck in bad equilibria such that high-quality
citizens avoid public oﬃce because so do other high-quality citizens. Also, countries may
experience persistent low quality of the policymaking class, whereby low-quality policymakers
in one period set up next period￿s incentives so as to keep high-quality ones from seeking
oﬃce. As a result, otherwise identical countries can experience diﬀerent average levels of
competence and/or honesty of the political class.
30We have not formally investigated the case of endogenous w, but it seems to us that ￿ once again ￿
policymakers with relatively lower quality have an incentive to discourage participation by candidates of
relatively higher quality. Hence, path dependence should again be a possibility. Additional sources of path
dependence may arise if, as seems realistic, corruption costs are higher for rich (high-ability) citizens than
for poor (low-ability) ones. In particular, low-skill citizens will be extremely averse to paying high salaries to
oﬃce holders (since they are not aﬀected by corruption) whereas high-skill citizens will be willing to pay high
salaries to stem corruption. Low- (high-) ability majorities would then choose low (high) wages.
28References
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1997): ￿The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and some
New Results,￿ Political Studies, XLV, 496-515.
Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal (1995): Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the
Economy, Cambridge University Press.
Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal (1996): ￿A Theory of Divided Government,￿ Econometrica,
64, 1311-41.
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. Cohen (1997): Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy,
MIT Press.
Alesina, A., and S. Spear (1988): ￿An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Com-
petition,￿ Journal of Public Economics, 37, 359-379.
Andvig, J.C., and K. Moene (1990): ￿How Corruption May Corrupt,￿ Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization, 13, 63-76.
Bardhan, P. (1997): ￿Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,￿ Journal of
Economic Literature, XXXV, 1320-1346.
Becker, G. and C. Mulligan (1998): ￿Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government,￿
NBER Working Paper No. 6789.
Besley, T.J.. and S. Coate (1997): ￿An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII, 85-114.
Besley, T.J.. and S. Coate (1998): ￿Sources of Ineﬃciency in a Representative Democracy:
A Dynamic Analysis,￿ American Economic Review, 88, 139-156.
Besley, T.J. and J. McLaren (1993): ￿Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives,￿
Economic Journal, 103, 119-141.
Cadot, O. (1987): ￿Corruption as a Gamble,￿ Journal of Public Economics, 32, 223-44.
Charap, J. and C. Harm (1999): ￿Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic
State,￿ IMF Working Paper.
Cukierman, A. and A. Meltzer (1986): ￿A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the
Cost of Democratic Government, and the Bene￿ts of a Constitution,￿ Economic Inquiry,2 4 ,
367-388.
Dal B· o, E. and R. Di Tella (1999): ￿Democracy under Pressure: Political Parties vs.
29￿Nasty￿ Interest Groups,￿ unpublished, Harvard University.
Hines, J. (1995): ￿Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business Since
1977,￿ NBER Working Paper No. 5266.
Kaufmann, D. (1997): ￿Some Myths and Facts,￿ Foreign Policy, Summer, 114-131.
Kaufmann, D. and S. Wei (1999): ￿Does ￿Grease Money￿ Speed Up the Wheels of
Commerce?￿ NBER Working Paper No. 7093.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1998): ￿The Quality of
Government,￿ NBER Working Paper 6727.
Mauro, P. (1995): ￿Corruption and Growth,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics,C X I ,
681-712.
Myerson, R.B. (1993): ￿Eﬀectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government
Corruption, a Game-Theoretic Analysis,￿ Games and Economic Behavior 5, 118-132.
Myrdal, G. (1968): ￿Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations,￿ Pantheon
Books.
Osborne, M.J. and A. Slivinski (1996): ￿A Model of Political Competition with Citizen
Candidates,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXI, 65-96.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics,
Harwood Academic Publishers.
Rogoﬀ, K. and A. Sibert (1988), ￿Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,￿ Review
of Economic Studies, 55, 1-16.
Rogoﬀ, K. (1990), ￿Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,￿ American Economic Review,
80, 21-36.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978): Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1993): ￿Corruption,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics,1 0 8 ,
599-617.
Tanzi, V. (1997), ￿Corruption around the World,￿ IMF Staﬀ Papers, 45, 559-594.
Tirole, J. (1996): ￿A Theory of Collective Reputations,￿ Review of Economic Studies,6 3 ,
1-22.
Wei, S. (1997), ￿How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?￿ NBER Working
Paper No. 6030.
30Appendix 1: Path Dependence in the Linear Case
This section studies in greater detail the example of path dependence of Section 3.3 for
the special case in which
t(ps)=β − γps (7)
and
τ(w)=δw. (8)
In this case we have (recall that we have normalized π = φ)
w = λ − (β − γ) − δw =
λ − β + γ
1+δ
and
w = λ − β − δw =
λ − β
1+δ
low-ability citizens￿ expected utility when w = w is
Us(w)=1− β + γ − δ
λ − β + γ
1+δ
=
1+δ(1 − λ) − β + γ
1+δ
.
As discussed in Section 3.3, under the assumption that η(λ − 1+φ)/φ > 1 all low-ability












1+δ(1 − λ) − β + η(1 + δ)(λ − 1+φ) − (1 + δ)φ
1+δ
.
Now suppose that Us(w) <U s(w), or
η(1 + δ)(λ − 1+φ) − (1 + δ)φ > γ (9)
which is certainly possible. Notice that the condition is more likely to be satis￿ed if η is
large (a large probability of election when competing with only low-skill candidates makes
the competition more worthwhile), if λ is large (a large λ implies a large w, so being in oﬃce
is more valuable ￿ we are assuming that δ is small, which is likely), and if φ is small (obvious).
It is less likely to be satis￿ed if γ is large (as in this case it is very valuable to have good
politicians in oﬃce in case of defeat at the election).
31Suppose then that the above condition is satis￿ed, and suppose that the wage is set to
maximize the per-period utility of low-ability citizens. We can show that ￿ if δ is suﬃciently
small ￿ the wage will then be (permanently) set at w. To the left of w low-skill citizens￿
utility is ηw +( 1− η)(1 − β − δw), which is increasing in w for δ small. To the right of w
their utility is 1 − β + γ − δw, which is decreasing in w. Hence, the optimal choice is in the
interval [w,w). On this interval, expected utility as long as all are running is
Us(w)=η(1 − ps)w +[ 1− η(1 − ps)][1 − β + γps − δw − φ].





[(1 + δ)w + β − λ].
Substituting and simplifying we then have
Us(w)=w −
½
1 − η + η
1
γ
[(1 + δ)w + β − λ]
¾
(λ − 1+φ)




(1 + δ)(λ − 1+φ)
which has the same sign as
γ − η(1 + δ)(λ − 1+φ)
which is negative because of restriction (9).
Intuitively, restriction (9) says that low-ability citizens prefer the equilibrium associated
with w to the one associated with w. In turn, the latter must be strictly better than the
situation in which the wage is w and all low-quality citizens run for oﬃce. But since utility
￿ conditional on everybody running ￿ is linear, if the slope was positive we would have a
contradiction.
Since the slope of the objective function is negative on [w,w) the optimal choice is w.
Since here ps =0 ,w eh a v ep a t hd e p e n d e n c e .
32Appendix 2: Analysis of two-dimensional case.
Let us ￿rst discuss candidate equilibria above the diagonal, such as, for example, point
(p∗
h,p ∗
s) in Figure 4. First, for this to be an equilibrium it must necessarily feature phs > 0, as
points in this region are unattainable without hs types in oﬃce. Then, the OIC for hs types
would pass for this point, as an equilibrium (other than (1,1 ) )i nt h i sr e g i o nr e q u i r e st h e s e
types to be certain of election and therefore indiﬀerent between public and private jobs. But
if the hs types are indiﬀerent between private and public jobs then all other types strictly
prefer being oﬃce holders. Given this strict preference, the point under consideration can
be an equilibrium only if such types are uncertain of election. In particular, the measure
of candidates of these two types will be determined by a condition stating that ￿ given the
probability of being elected (itself a function of the measure of candidates) and the cost of
running φ ￿ such individuals strictly prefer or are indiﬀerent between running for oﬃce or not.
In other words, there is ￿excess supply￿ of hs and hs types. In turn, this implies that there
cannot be citizens of type hs holding oﬃce. Given our assumption of conditionally sincere
voting, non-candidates will always vote in a way that all positions are ￿lled by candidates
with at least one quality. For example, there cannot be an equilibrium in which all non-
candidates vote for types hs, and all other types have therefore equal probability of being
elected. For, in this case, some of the non-candidates have a dominating voting deviation in
which instead of voting for an hs type they vote for a hs or a hs type.
In summary, any candidate equilibrium above the diagonal features phs = Phs = Chs =0 .
Then, point (p∗
h,p ∗
s) is supported by a unique combination of shares of citizens of the various
types holding oﬃce. For a point (p∗
h,p ∗
s) this combination is the solution to the system of
three equations in three unknowns phs + phs = p∗
h, phs + phs = p∗
s,a n dphs + phs + phs =1 .
We can now argue that if (p∗
h,p ∗
s) is outside of the 45 curve it cannot be part of an
equilibrium. Recall that outside of the 45 curve the UICs have slope diﬀerent from -45
degrees. Suppose it is steeper. Then there must necessarily be at least one non-candidate
who could deviate from his voting strategy and transfer his vote from a winning candidate
of type hs to a losing candidate of type hs. Should this deviation prove pivotal, this voter
would have moved the equilibrium down and to the right along a -45 degree line. But
such a move would determine an increase in utility for the voter, as it would take him to
33a higher indiﬀerence curve. Hence, this voting deviation is pro￿table (in the conditionally
sincere sense) and the equilibrium is broken. Of course, if at a point above the diagonal the
indiﬀerence curve is ￿atter than -45 degrees, the equilibrium breaking deviation is to vote for
ac a n d i d a t eo ft y p ehs over a candidate of type hs.
Now let us focus on candidate equilibria below the diagonal. For such a point to be an
equilibrium, at least one of the three types having at least one quality must strictly prefer to
hold oﬃce. If none did, then types hs and hs would for sure strictly prefer private life. But
then no point with ph > 0 would be feasible. This strict preference for oﬃce implies that
at least one of the three desirable types is in ￿excess supply,￿ in the sense that some of the
candidates of this type do not get elected. But at the same time we have ph + ps < 1, as we
a r eb e l o wt h ed i a g o n a l ,s ot h e r em u s tb es o m ehs types in oﬃc e .T h i si si n c o n s i s t e n tw i t h
our equilibrium concept as voters would then deviate in such a way to replace some of the
hs oﬃce holders with candidates of more desirable type.
Next, we consider points on the diagonal to the right of the 45 line. If a point in this
region were an equilibrium, and it featured hs types in oﬃce, then it would also have to
feature some hs in oﬃce, otherwise the shares of the four types holding oﬃce could not add
up to 1. But if some hs c i t i z e ni si no ﬃce then types hs and hs must strictly prefer to hold
oﬃce, so voters once again have a dominating conditionally sincere deviation. Hence, this
equilibrium could never feature phs > 0, and since we must have ph + ps = 1 this means
there can be no hs types in oﬃce. Next note that for this to be an equilibrium, citizens
of type hs must weakly prefer being oﬃce holders (otherwise ph = 0), which implies that
citizens of type hs strictly prefer to hold public oﬃce (recall our assumption on the ranking of
OICs). Hence, candidates of type hs are in excess supply, and voters have access to a voting
deviation moving up and to the left on the diagonal. By de￿nition of the 45 curve such a
deviation dominates in ￿as if pivotal￿ sense the point under consideration, and this cannot
be an equilibrium. A very similar argument can be used to rule out points on the horizontal
axis, where we have ps =0 ,t h ehs types have a strict preference for holding oﬃce, and the
UIC has slope less than 45 degrees.
U pt on o ww eh a v ee l i m i n a t e da l lp o i n t sn o to nt h es o l i dl o c u si nF i g u r e4 . W en o w
discuss the conditions under which points on the solid locus are equilibria. Points on the 45
34curve above the diagonal are equilibria if and only if they also lie on the OIC of hs types. If
they do not (only if) then either the hs types strictly prefer oﬃce (in which case we would
jump to (1,1)), or they strictly prefer private life (in which case the point is unfeasible). If
they do (if) citizens of type hs are indiﬀerent between holding oﬃce and living private lives,
and those who are candidates are all elected and have no incentive to deviate. The other two
￿one-quality￿ types strictly prefer oﬃce and are in excess supply: their participation to the
elections determined by the condition that ￿ given the probability of election and the cost of
running ￿ they weakly prefer to be candidates. Citizens of type hs are non-candidates. And
non-candidates have no dominating conditionally sincere voting deviation as the indiﬀerence
curve lies entirely above the 45 degree line through this point.
Consider now the diagonal above the 45 curve. The claim is that points in this region are
equilibria if and only if they also lie on the OIC of type hs citizens. By the same argument
used for the section of the diagonal below the 45 curve, equilibria on this locus must feature
phs = phs =0 .T h e nw em u s th a v et h a tc i t i z e n shs weakly prefer being in oﬃce (otherwise
ph = 0), which implies that citizens hs have a strict preference for public service. Now if
the hs￿s preference were strict, so that candidates of this type were in excess supply, then a
voting deviation down and to the right on the diagonal would be feasible. But by de￿nition
of the 45 curve such a deviation weakly dominates the point under consideration. This shows
that hs citizens must be indiﬀerent between private and public life, i.e., the only if part of
our claim. Now if the hs are exactly indiﬀerent between private and public life the number of
candidates is equal to the number of elected individuals of this type, and a voting deviation
down and to the right (the only one attractive) is unfeasible. This proves the if part of the
claim.
We are left with the vertical axis. Points on the vertical axis are equilibria if and only if
they also lie on the OIC of citizens of type hs. If they are above it they are unfeasible, as no
person of high ability would agree to stay in oﬃce. If they are below it, then hs candidates
would be in excess supply, and it would be possible to replace some of the hs oﬃce holders
(who necessarily hold oﬃce in this region). On points on the hs￿s OIC, instead, the number
of hs candidates is equal to the number of hs winners. The other types with at least one
quality strictly prefer private life (and are not candidate) and the types with no quality are
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